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Abstract
This paper builds a large overlapping generations model of a small open economy featuring 
imperfect competition in the labor and product markets to understand i) which were the 
main determinants of the large expansionary phase experienced in Spain from the mid-
1990s until the arrival of the global fi nancial crisis in 2007-2008, ii) what role fi scal policy and 
structural reforms could have played to avoid the build-up of large external imbalance over 
this period, and iii) how these policies could affect the recovery of economic activity in Spain 
after the crisis. Our results indicate that falling interest rates and demographic changes were 
the main drivers of the Spanish expansionary phase. As for the macroeconomic behavior 
of the Spanish economy after the crisis, our results suggest that a front-loading in fi scal 
consolidation together with structural reforms that eliminate distortions in the goods and 
labor markets could make the recovery of economic activity in Spain more successful.
Keywords: overlapping generations, imperfect competition, fi scal consolidation, demographic 
change, structural reforms.
JEL classifi cation: E62, H30, J11.
Resumen
Este artículo considera un modelo de generaciones solapadas, aplicado a una economía 
pequeña, abierta al comercio internacional y caracterizada por la existencia de competencia 
imperfecta en los mercados de bienes y de trabajo, para analizar: i) cuáles fueron los 
principales determinantes de la expansión observada en la economía española desde 
mediados de los 1990s hasta la llegada de la crisis fi nanciera global en 2007-2008, ii) qué 
papel podrían haber jugado la política fi scal y las reformas estructurales en la reducción del 
desequilibrio externo acumulado durante este periodo, y iii) cómo estas políticas podrían 
infl uir en el proceso de recuperación de la actividad económica en España después de 
la crisis. Los resultados apuntan a que la caída en los tipos de interés y los cambios 
demográfi cos fueron los principales factores que impulsaron la última etapa expansiva en 
España. En cuanto al comportamiento macroeconómico de la economía española después 
de la crisis, los resultados sugieren que un adelanto en el proceso de consolidación fi scal, 
junto con la introducción de reformas estructurales que reduzcan las distorsiones existentes 
en los mercados de bienes y de trabajo, contribuirían a que la recuperación de la actividad 
fuera más exitosa.
Palabras claves: generaciones solapadas, competencia imperfecta, consolidación fi scal, 
cambio demográfi co, reformas estructurales.
Códigos JEL: E62, H30, J11.
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1 Introduction
From the mid-1990s to 2008, the Spanish economy enjoyed a phase of sustained
economic growth in which real convergence with the core EMU member countries
advanced notably. This expansionary phase was mostly driven by two factors. First,
by a significant expansion of credit, that was induced by the fall in interest rates that
followed Spain’s adhesion to the EMU and, more broadly, by a pervasive relaxation
in the conditions of access to credit. And second, by the large immigration inflows
into Spain over the period that substantially modified the demographic structure of
the Spanish population.1
Yet significant imbalances built up in the process. On the one hand, the Spanish
economy became increasingly more dependent of external financing over the period.
The fall in interest rates and the overall expansion of credit led to an investment
boom, much of which materialized in the housing sector, that increased the share
of investment in GDP from around 22% in 1995 to 29% in 2008. Thus, despite a
move toward fiscal consolidation by the public sector, the Spanish current account
deficit, that was close to zero in 1998, increased nearly monotonically over the period,
reaching almost 10% of GDP by 2008. On the other hand, price-competitiveness of the
Spanish economy also deteriorated significantly, due to very low productivity growth
and to the existence of important distortions in the domestic labor and product
markets.
When the global financial crisis struck and the very favorable international credit
conditions suddenly disappeared, the Spanish economy began an inevitable adjust-
ment process, with a substantial reduction in consumption and investment by 2008q4,
when housing investment plummeted. This adjustment, that has helped to correct
the excessive indebtedness of the private sector, has led however to a large decrease
in economic activity, with GDP growth in 2009 at around -3.6%. At the same time,
the work of automatic stabilizers, the loss of the revenue windfalls obtained during
the expansion and the expansionary fiscal programs put in place by the government
to mitigate the effects of the crisis, have led to a very rapid deterioration of public
accounts, that have moved from a surplus of around 2% of GDP in 2007 to deficits of
1For a recent account of the evolution of the Spanish economy during this period, see Estrada,
Jimeno and Malo de Molina (2009).
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 10 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1107
around 4% and 11% in 2008 and 2009, respectively. All together, the Spanish econ-
omy has very quickly reduced its need for external financing as its current account
deficit has decreased from around 10% of GDP in 2008 to around 6% in 2009, being
now mostly driven by fiscal deficits rather than by private indebtedness as in the
expansionary phase.
With this evidence in mind, several questions arise: i) to what extent are the
fall in interest rates and the profound demographic changes witnessed in the Spanish
economy over the last decade responsible for the expansionary phase and the build-up
of imbalances?, ii) could have fiscal policy contributed more to avoid the build-up of
these imbalances?, iii) how would structural reforms increasing competition in the
product and labor markets have diminished the saving-investment gap and the loss
of price-competitiveness of that period?, and iv) looking ahead, once the economy has
been hit by the global financial shock in 2008, how would alternative fiscal policies
and reforms in the labor and product markets may affect the expected macroeconomic
evolution of the Spanish economy?
In order to address these questions, this paper constructs and calibrates a small
open economy model for Spain. The model economy is composed by households, firms
and a government. To properly incorporate the intense demographic changes that the
Spanish economy experienced over the last decade, and those expected to happen in
the future, this paper considers a large scale overlapping generations model.2 In each
period, households take consumption, labor and savings decisions to maximize their
lifetime utility. There are four types of firms in the economy, that produce a final
consumption good, intermediate goods, labor services and capital services. As the
Spanish economy is characterized by rigid labor and product markets, the model in-
corporates distortions in these markets via monopoly power of intermediate goods and
labor services producers. This approach, relatively standard in the new Keynesian
literature, is less common in the large scale OLG literature, that typically considers
perfect competition in all markets. The government in the model consumes, gives
lump-sum transfers, runs a social security system, levies taxes (on consumption and
on labor and capital income) and issues debt. The description of the social security
2In this sense, the model is an extended version of the general equilibrium model with overlapping
generations used in Izquierdo, Jimeno and Rojas (2010) to evaluate the impact of immigration on
the Spanish economy, and in Jimeno, Rojas and Puente (2008) and Rojas (2005) to analyze the
consequences of population ageing in Spain.
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system in the model is particularly rich. This is very relevant since, undoubtedly, one
needs to take into account the pressures on the social security system generated by
the aging of the Spanish baby-boom generation in the near future in order to prop-
erly analyze the role played by fiscal policy in the recent and future macroeconomic
developments of the Spanish economy.
The model is calibrated to match the main macroeconomic features of the Spanish
economy in 1998 and then its performance of over the period 1998-2008 is analyzed
under different scenarios concerning interest rates, demographic developments, fiscal
policies and labor and product market distortions. Our results indicate that, in line
with Izquierdo, Jimeno and Rojas (2010), interest rates and demographic changes are
the main responsible for the investment boom and the build-up of a sizable external
imbalance (measured as the ratio of net foreign assets to GDP) witnessed in the
Spanish economy during the expansionary phase. In this context, we find a very
limited role for fiscal policy in reducing the external imbalance accumulated in Spain
over the period 1998-2008. In particular, our results show that a temporary reduction
of government expenditure over the expansionary phase would have reduced the size
of the Spanish external imbalance by 2008 only very slightly. A more permanent
tightening of fiscal policy could have even increased this imbalance. With respect to
the effects of structural reforms in product and labor markets pursuing an increase
in competition in these markets, we find that, although they would have not helped
in reducing the external imbalance of the Spanish economy over the period 1998-
2008, they would have led to a short- and long-run expansion of output, employment
and investment, and to a substantial improvement in competitiveness and in public
accounts. It is precisely due to these positive effects on the economy that these
structural reforms may naturally induce in the short-run an increase in the external
indebtedness of the economy, as forward-looking households anticipate lower taxes
and a more efficient economy in the future and try to smooth their consumption.
As for the macroeconomic behavior of the Spanish economy beyond 2008, our
model suggests that, even without the arrival of the crisis, in the medium- and long-
run the Spanish economy would have entered into a phase of lower GDP growth
where the external imbalance of the economy would have been reduced but where
public accounts would have deteriorated. This process, mostly driven by the aging
of the Spanish population, has become more pronounced with global financial cri-
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sis. Futhermore, the model highlights the relevance of fiscal policy and of structural
reforms in the post-crisis scenario. Front-loading in fiscal consolidation would con-
tribute to public accounts’ sustainability and to mitigate the output losses induced by
the crisis in the medium-term. In addition, policies aimed at improving competition
help in reducing short- and medium-term output losses, while inducing a positive
long-run effect on the level of output.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and
Section 3 its calibration. Departing from the model economy calibrated to 1998,
Section 4 quantifies the role played by demographic developments and interest rates
in shaping the Spanish macroeconomic evolution over the period of analysis and
performs counterfactual exercises regarding alternative fiscal policies and labor and
product markets reforms. Then, Section 5 introduces the global financial crisis that
hit the economy in 2008 into our model and shows its predictions beyond that date.
Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
This section describes the model used to perform the quantitative experiments re-
ported on the following sections on the macroeconomic effects of interest rates, de-
mographic changes, fiscal policy and product and labor market reforms. In essence,
it is a model for a small open economy within a monetary union that combines, on
the household side, the large scale overlapping generations structure of Auerbach
and Kotlikoff (1987) and, on the supply side, the now standard framework in the
new Keynesian literature with firms producing final and intermediate goods, labor
and capital services in the presence of monopolistic competition in the intermediate
goods and labor markets.3 The model economy is completed by a government that
has a wide range of fiscal instruments at its disposal.
2.1 Households
Demographics.- The economy has overlapping generations of agents who live a max-
imum of I periods. The agents differ in their age, i ∈ {1, 2, ..., I}, and in their place
of birth, n ∈ {1, 2, ..., I}, where n = 1 identifies a native and n = n0 ≥ 2 denotes an
3Unlike the new Keynesian literature we do not consider price rigidities.
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immigrant who first entered the economy with age n0.4 We use Ni,n,t to denote the
total number of agents of type (i, n) in the economy at period t and μi,n,t to denote
the share of these agents over the total population at that period. The former evolves
over time in the following fashion:
N1,1,t =

i

n
Ni,n,t−1fi,t−1 (Births) (1)
Ni,1,t = Ni−1,1,t−1si−1,t−1, ∀i ≥ 2 (Natives) (2)
Ni,n,t = Ni−1,n,t−1si−1,t−1 +NIi,n,t, ∀i ≥ 2, ∀n ≥ 2 (Immigrants) (3)
where si−1,t−1 denotes the conditional probability of surviving from age i − 1 to
age i at period t − 1, fi,t−1 is the probability of an agent of age i of having an
offspring at that period, and NIi,n,t is equal to 0 when i = n and to the number of
immigrants of age i exogenously entering the economy at the beginning of period t
when i = n. We assume that the survival and fertility probabilities are common to
natives and immigrants, since there is no independent data readily available for these
two population groups, and we consider the offspring of immigrants as natives.
Decision problem.- At an exogenous age IA agents start taking decisions. At
that time they have no assets, besides transfers emanating from accidental bequests.
In each period, agents take consumption and labor decisions in order to maximize
lifetime utility. At period t an agent of type (v, n) solves the following problem:
Max
I
i=v
βi−vψiv,tU(ci,n,t+i−v, hi,n,t+i−v) (4)
subject to
(1 + τ ct) ci,n,t + ai+1,n,t+1 ≤ (1− τ lt − τ sst )wi,thi,n,t + (1 + rt(1− τat ))(ai,n,t + bt) +
ssi,n,t + trt + divt ∀t (5)
In the expression above, c is consumption, a denotes beginning of period assets
and h is time spent at work. Agents are endowed with one unit of time per period.
Between ages IA and IR − 1 this unit of time must be allocated between labor and
4We need to keep track of the age at which immigrants entered the economy because we assume
that they arrive with no assets (as in, for instance, Storesletten (2000, 2003) and Razin and Sadka
(1999)). Thus, conditional on age, two immigrants arriving to the economy at different ages take
different consumption and labor decisions because they do not have the same wealth level.
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leisure. Afterwards, agents are forced to retire. Only then, they receive social security
benefits, ss, and devote their entire time endowment to leisure. In each period,
regardless of their type, agents receive lump transfers, tr, accidental asset bequests,
b, and dividends from the different firms operating in the economy, div. Regarding
prices and taxes, we normalize the price of the final good consumed by households
to one, w is the age-dependent wage (in units of c) agents receive for their working
time, r is the net real interest rate paid on savings, τ lt and τ
ss
t are labor income taxes
(the latter being the social security tax), and τ ct and τ
a
t denote proportional taxes on
consumption and capital income, respectively. Finally, β is the discount parameter
and ψiv,t is the unconditional probability of reaching age i for an individual that has
age v at period t. Thus, ψiv,t =
i
k=v+1 sk−1,t+k−v−1 with ψ
v
v,t = 1.
2.2 Firms
Final good firm.- In each period, a final consumption good, Yt, is produced within the
small open economy by a perfectly competitive firm. The firm does so by combining
a continuum of domestic intermediate goods, yH,j,t, j ∈ (0, 1), and a continuum of
foreign intermediate goods, yF,z,t, z ∈ (0, 1), using the following technology:
Yt =

(αC)
1
ηC Y
ηC−1
ηC
H,t + (1− αC)
1
ηc Y
ηC−1
ηC
F,t
	 ηC
ηC−1
(6)
where YH,t and YF,t are composites of the continuum of domestic and of foreign
intermediate goods, respectively, and follow the constant elasticity of substitution
functions
YH,t =
⎡
⎣
1
0
y
1
λit
H,j,t dj
⎤
⎦
λit
, 1 ≤ λit <∞ (7)
YF,t =
⎡
⎣
1
0
y
1
λi∗t
F,z,t dz
⎤
⎦
λi∗t
, 1 ≤ λi∗t <∞ (8)
In the expressions above, (1− αc) is the share of imports in consumption, ηc is
the elasticity of substitution between the domestic and foreign composite goods, and
λit (λ
i∗
t ) denotes the time-varying substitutability of domestic (foreign) intermediate
goods in the production of YH,t (YF,t). Let pH,j,t (pF,z,t) denote the price (in units of
c) of the domestic (foreign) intermediate good j (z) in period t. Profit maximization
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by the final good firm implies the following demands for the composite goods YH,t
and YF,t, and for each intermediate good yH,j,t and yF,z,t:
YH,t = αCp
−ηC
H,t Yt, yH,j,t =

pH,j,t
pH,t
 λit
1−λit
YH,t (9)
YF,t = (1− αC) p−ηCF,t Yt, yF,z,t =

pF,z,t
pF,t
 λi∗t
1−λi∗t
YF,t (10)
where prices are related in the following fashion:
1 =

αCp
1−ηC
H,t + (1− αC) p
1−ηC
F,t
 1
1−ηC (11)
pH,t =
⎡
⎣
1
0
p
1
1−λit
H,j,t dj
⎤
⎦
1−λit
(12)
pF,t =
⎡
⎣
1
0
p
1
1−λi∗t
F,z,t dz
⎤
⎦
1−λi∗t
(13)
Intermediate good firms.- Each domestic intermediate good, yH,j,t, j ∈ (0, 1), is
produced within the small open economy by a monopolist who rents capital, K, and
labor, L, in the market and uses the technology
yH,j,t = K
ξ
H,j,t (AtLH,j,t)
1−ξ (14)
where 0 < ξ < 1 and At denotes economy-wide labor augmenting technological
change. As in Christiano et al. (2005), we rule out entry and exit into the production
of intermediate goods. Profit maximization by these monopolists implies that, in
each period, they set the price for their differentiated goods with a mark-up over
their marginal costs. Namely:
pH,j,t = λ
i
tMCH,j,t (15)
where the marginal cost, MCH,j,t, depends on the rental price of the labor and
capital inputs, Wt and pK,t, respectively, according to
MCH,j,t =

ξ
1− ξ
−ξ 
Wt
pK,t
−ξ
Wt
At (1− ξ)
(16)
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At the end of each period, the profits of these monopolists, πH,j,t, j ∈ (0, 1) are
distributed to the households in the form of dividends.
Firms producing labor services.- In each period, a representative competitive firm
buys labor hours of households of different ages and transforms them into an aggregate
labor input, Lt, which then sells to the domestic intermediate producers, using the
following technology:
Lt =
⎡
⎣
IR−1
i=IA

1
IR − IA
λlt−1
λlt
(eiLi,t)
1
λlt
⎤
⎦
λlt
, 1 ≤ λlt <∞ (17)
where Li,t is the total number of labor hours supplied by age-i households, ei is
an age-specific index which transforms those raw labor hours into efficient units of
labor, and λlt measures the time-varying substitutability of labor hours of households
of different ages in the production of the aggregate labor input. Profit maximization
by this representative firm in the labor market implies that its demand for labor hours
of age-i households is equal to:
Li,t =

1
IR − IA

w˜i,t
Wt
 λlt
1−λlt
(ei)
1
1−λlt Lt (18)
where w˜i,t denotes the price that this firm pays for one hour of labor of an age-i
household and Wt is the unit price of the aggregate labor input. These are related
via:
Wt =

IR−1
i=IA

1
IR − IA

w˜i,t
ei
 1
1−λlt
1−λlt
(19)
In Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000), among others, each household is considered
to be a monopoly supplier of a differentiated labor service implying that they can
set their own wage. In this paper, due to the overlapping generations nature of our
model, we follow a slightly different route to incorporate this friction in the labor
market. Namely, we consider that, for each age i ∈ [IA, IR − 1], there is a monopoly
who buys labor hours directly to the households of age i at price wi,t, and sells them
to the representative firm producing the aggregate labor input at price w˜i,t. As usual,
these monopoly suppliers set their price with a mark-up over their marginal cost
which, in this case, implies that w˜i,t = λ
l
twi,t, i ∈ [IA, IR − 1]. At the end of each
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period, these firms distribute their profits, πL,i,t, i ∈ [IA, IR− 1], to the households in
the form of dividends.
The monopoly power of these firms comes from the fact that, as considered in (17),
labor hours of households of different ages are imperfect substitutes in the production
of the aggregate labor input. In this set up, as opposed to Erceg, Henderson and Levin
(2000), households do not have any monopoly power because their labor hours are
perfect substitutes in the production of the aggregate labor input with those of all the
other households in the economy with the same age. Nevertheless, for the purposes
of this paper, the relevant issue is that there exists a distortion in the labor market
that leads to a misalignment between prices and marginal costs and not whether the
monopoly power is held by the households or by these intermediate labor producers.
Investment firm.- In this small open economy, all capital is owned by a repre-
sentative firm which rents it to the domestic intermediate producers at a unit price
pK,t and takes investment decisions. Investment is assumed to be given by a CES
aggregate of domestic and imported goods. Namely,
It =

(αI)
1
ηI I
ηI−1
ηI
H,t + (1− αI)
1
ηI I
ηI−1
ηI
F,t
	 ηI
ηI−1
(20)
where (1− αI) is the share of imports in investment, IH and IF are the same
composites of the continuum of domestic and of foreign intermediate goods as in (7)
and (8), respectively, and ηI is the elasticity of substitution between these composite
goods in investment. Thus, the unit price of this investment aggregate is given by
pI,t =

αIp
1−ηI
H,t + (1− αI) p
1−ηI
F,t
 1
1−ηI (21)
and the demands of the domestic and foreign composites of the continuum of
domestic and foreign intermediate goods, respectively, are given by
IH,t = αI

pH,t
pI,t
−ηI
It (22)
IF,t = (1− αI)

pF,t
pI,t
−ηI
It (23)
We follow Christiano et al. (2005) and assume that this firm’s investment decisions
are conditioned by the existence of quadratic investment adjustment costs. As argued
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in Lucca (2007), these adjustment costs are equivalent, up to a first order linearization,
to a time-to-build representation of the investment process. Furthermore, along the
lines of Garrett and Priestley (2000), among others, we also consider that this firm
faces costs of changing the amount of dividends it distributes to households at the end
of each period. Thus, in each period t this representative firm chooses an investment
sequence to maximize, given prices, its discounted flow of future dividends, net of the
dividends adjustment costs:
max
{Is}s=t,t+1,..
∞
s=t


s
j=t+1
1
1 + rj

ds −
ς
2

ds
ds−1
− 1
2
(24)
subject to:
ds = (1− τ ks)pK,sKs − pI,sIs

1 + S

Is
Is−1

(25)
Ks+1 = (1− δ)Ks + Is (26)
where ς > 0 gives a measure of the dividends adjustment costs, τ k is a proportional
tax rate on this firm’s capital rents, and, as usual, the investment adjustment cost
function, S(·), satisfies that S(1) = S (1) = 0 and S (1) ≡ χ > 0.
2.3 Government
The government of this small open economy consumes, gives lump-sum transfers,
runs a social security system, levies taxes and issues debt. In each period, the gov-
ernment devotes an exogenously given amount of resources to consume, Gt, and to
give lump-sum transfers to the households, TRt = trt



n
I
i=IA
Ni,n,t

. It is assumed
that the government consumes the same final consumption good as households.5 The
government also spends resources in social security benefits SSt =

n
I
i=IR
Ni,n,tssi,n,t.
For each retired worker these benefits are assumed to represent a fraction  of its
average labor earnings in the last ISS periods before retirement. In order to finance
these expenditures, the government may issue debt, Dt+1, or levy proportional taxes
on households’ consumption (τ ct), labor income (τ
l
t and τ
ss
t ) and capital income (τ
a
t ),
5Aggregate household consumption (Ct) involves consuming domestic (CH,t) and foreign goods
(CF,t). Given equation (6), which defines the final consumption good, it is possible to derive that
CH,t = αC (pH,t)−ηC Ct and CF,t = (1− αC) (pF,t)−ηC Ct. The same applies to Gt, which can be
divided into GH,t and GF,t.
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and on the investment firm’s capital rents (τ kt ). Thus, the government’s budget con-
straint in period t is:
Gt + TRt + SSt + (1 + rt)Dt = Dt+1 + τ
c
tCt +

τ lt + τ
ss
t

n
IR−1
i=IA
Ni,n,twi,thi,n,t +
τat rtAt + τ
k
t pK,tKt (27)
where Ct =

n
I
i=IA
Ni,n,tci,n,t and At =

n
I
i=IA
Ni,n,t(ai,n,t + bt) denote aggregate
households’ consumption and financial assets, respectively, Dt is the stock of public
debt outstanding at the beginning of period t, and rt is the exogenous interest rate
in the small open economy.
As usual in models like this, a fiscal rule is needed so as to avoid explosive dynamics
of public debt. We follow Kilponen et al. (2006) and, for the simulation exercises
described in Section 4, we consider that the proportional labor income tax rate τ l
adjusts in each period to accommodate deviations of this rate and of the debt to GDP
ratio from corresponding target levels according to the following rule:6
τ lt = τ
l
t−1 − κ1(τ lt−1 − τ¯ l) + κ2(
Dt
GDPt
− D
GDP
) (28)
where κ1 > 0 and κ2 > 0 measure the sensitivity of τ l to deviations of τ l and
D
GDP
, respectively, from their targets.
In our simulation exercises below, we use (28) looking for a compromise between
long-term and short-term dynamics in the following sense. On the one hand, from
a long-term perspective, it seems reasonable to consider, as in (28), that excessive
debt scenarios need to be corrected via tax rate adjustments. For instance, there is a
general consensus that the pressure on public accounts that will be induced in the near
future by the aging of the Spanish baby-boom generation would require significant
tax reforms. On the other hand, in the short run, in line with the small changes in
tax rates typically observed in the data, it seems more reasonable to assume that
(28) does not apply. Thus, in order to accommodate these long- and short-term
perspectives, in the simulation exercises presented in Section 4 we assume that (28)
6As it will be clear in Section 3, for the calibration of the model we do not use this fiscal rule.
We simply fix the ratio of public debt to GDP to a target level and obtain a labor income tax rate
τ l endogenously so as to balance the government budget.
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only operates beyond 2008, so that τ l stays constant at its value in the calibration
exercise prior to that date. Beyond 2008, when the rule is at work, we consider that
D
GDP
= 0.60, in line with the Stability and Growth Pact in the euro area, that τ¯ l is
equal to its value in the calibration exercise and, following Kilponen et al. (2006),
that κ1 = 0.3 and κ2 = 0.1.
2.4 Foreign economy
As already mentioned above, in this small open economy a fraction (1− αI) of aggre-
gate investment and a fraction (1− αC) of aggregate private and public consumption
correspond to imports of foreign goods. By a symmetric argument, a fraction of the
domestic production of intermediate goods is exported abroad in each period to be-
come part of foreign aggregate consumption (private and public) and investment. In
this sense, in terms of the composite good defined in (7), which aggregates all domes-
tic intermediate goods, we assume that, in each period t, domestic exports abroad
equal Xt, defined as:
Xt =

pH,t
pF,t
−ηX
Y ∗t (29)
where ηX is the elasticity of substitution in the world economy between the do-
mestic and foreign composite goods, and Y ∗ is a measure of the total demand in that
economy, which is completely exogenous to the domestic economy. Equation (29)
closes the model. See the Appendix for a formal definition its equilibrium.
3 Calibration
An initial goal of this paper is to evaluate, in the context of the model described in
the previous section, the role played by interest rates, demographic developments,
fiscal policy and market distortions in explaining the macroeconomic performance of
the Spanish economy over its last expansionary phase. To carry out this quantitative
exercise we first need to set the values of the parameters, the initial conditions and
the exogenous sequences of the model. This section describes our calibration strategy
and Table 1 summarizes our parameter choices.7
7National accounts data are available at http://www.ine.es. Data for the current account and
international investment position come from Banco de España. Data on tax revenues are available
at http://www.meh.es.
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Target year.- We choose 1998 as our calibration target year, so as to focus on the
post-Euro performance of the Spanish economy. In this sense note that, although the
expansion of economic activity in Spain began some years before the creation of the
EMU, this process and the build-up of imbalances in the economy clearly accelerated
after 1998.
Initial distributions.- A complete characterization of the model requires initial
distributions of financial assets and of social security entitlements across households
to be specified. Rather than setting those initial distributions arbitrarily in 1998, we
set them for the year 1950, which then becomes the first year in our computations. By
starting our numerical analysis in 1950, we are able to obtain (initial) distributions
of financial assets and of social security entitlements across households in 1998 which
are optimally derived from the model and, given that 1950 is far from 1998, do not
depend on the initial distributions assumed in 1950.8
Demographics.- A period in the model corresponds to 1 year. Agents start tak-
ing economic decisions at age 16, they are forced to retire at age 65, and die with
probability 1 at age 100. We take the age structure of the population in 1950 from
the UN World Population Prospects. For the period 1951-1998 we propagate that
population according to equations (1) and (2) using age-specific fertility and survival
probabilities consistent with the evolution of average fertility and life-expectancy in
the data. Thus, we consider the 1950-1998 calibration period as a non-immigration
period (only native households are active). In this sense note that it was after 1998,
when immigrants represented less than 3% of the Spanish population, when the largest
immigration inflows into Spain took place.9 Beyond 1998, we propagate the popu-
lation under the assumption that households expect constant (at their 1998 levels)
fertility and survival probabilities and do not anticipate the immigration inflows hap-
pening after 1998. These flows will be described and incorporated into the analysis
in Section 4.
Preferences.- We assume a standard CRRA specification of the per period utility
8An additional reason to start our analysis in 1950 is that the demographic information provided
by the UN World Population Prospects also starts in that year.
9Furthermore, if we were to consider the presence of immigrants in Spain before 1999, we would
not have information available about the years in which those immigrants first entered in the country.
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function:
U(c, h) =

cθ(1− h)(1−θ)
1−σ
1− σ (30)
where σ and θ determine households’ risk aversion and the relative importance of
consumption over leisure, respectively. We set σ = 3, which falls within the standard
range of this parameter in the literature, and choose θ so that in 1998 households in
the model economy spend on average one-third of their time endowment at work.
Technology, foreign economy and discount factor.- From households’ point of view,
in order to generate an empirically plausible age profile of asset holdings, it is nec-
essary to account for the fact that earnings grow with experience. In this sense, the
standard practice in the literature is to endow agents with an age-specific profile of
productivity which in our model is represented by ei. We have obtained this profile
by computing average age-specific hourly wages from the Structural Earnings Survey
(SES) in Spain in 2002.
The depreciation rate of capital δ, the discount parameter β and the exogenous
world interest rate and output, r and Y ∗ respectively, are chosen simultaneously to
reproduce the following targets in 1998: i) a ratio of investment to GDP of 23.5%,
ii) a ratio of international investment position to GDP of −31.7%, iii) a ratio of net
exports to GDP of −0.22%, and iv) a ratio of exports to GDP of 26.7%. The values
generated by these targets are δ = 9.95%, β = 0.9964, r = 3% and Y ∗ = 0.0197.10
We set αC = 0.60, αI = 0.40, λ
l = 1.20 and λi = 1.10. This implies a 60% (40%)
share of domestic goods in consumption (investment) and a 20% (10%) markup in the
labor (product) market. These values fall within the typical range for these parame-
ters considered in the literature for the Spanish economy. Following Domenech and
Taguas (1995) we also set ξ = 0.375. Finally, regarding the elasticities of substitution
between domestic and foreign goods, we follow the work of Adolfson et al. (2007)
and consider that ηC = 5 and ηI = 2.5. Furthermore we assume that ηX = ηC .
Government.- In 1998, government consumption, government transfers and pub-
lic debt represented 17.3%, 5% and 64.1% of the Spanish GDP, respectively. In line
with this evidence, in the calibration exercise we choose sequences of government
10In 1998, the calibrated model exhibits a ratio of current account to GDP of −1.04% and a
capital-output ratio of 2.25. The values of these non-targeted variables are reasonably close to those
observed in the data (−0.11% and 2.42, respectively).
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consumption, government transfers and public debt such that, in each period, the
model economy replicates those ratios. As for taxes, the ratios of consumption taxes
to private consumption, of social security contributions to labor income and of cap-
ital taxes to GDP observed in Spain in 1998 were equal to 18%, 25.7% and 5.2%,
respectively. Consequently, in the calibration, we consider a constant proportional
consumption tax rate, τ ct , equal to 18%, a constant proportional social security tax
rate, τSSt , equal to 25.7%, and set constant capital income tax rates τ
a
t = τ
k
t = 14.8%
such that the model economy replicates the latter ratio.
Regarding to the social security system, the Spanish Regimen General de la Se-
guridad Social considers the last 15 years of contributions prior to retirement to
compute the pension. Thus, we choose ISS = 15 in our numerical exercises. As for
the pension replacement rate, , we set this parameter such that in 1998 our model
economy matches the ratio of social security expenses to GDP observed in the Span-
ish economy in that period (9.5%). Finally, in each period of the calibration exercise
we determine τ lt endogenously so that the government budget constraint (27) is met.
The value of the labor income tax that satisfies this restriction is 10.3% in 1998 (its
counterpart in the data is 12.1%).
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 24 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1107
Table 1: Calibrated parameters
Parameter Value Target
Demographics
IA 16 Assumed
IR 65 Assumed
I 100 Assumed
si,t and fi,t UN Population Prospects Data
Preferences
σ 3 Assumed
θ 0.5 Average labor hours = 1
3
Tech. and foreign ec.
ei Structural Earnings Survey Data
δ
β
r
Y ∗
0.0995
0.9964
0.03
0.0197
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
pII
GDP
= 23.5%
IIP
GDP
= −31.7%
X−M
GDP
= −0.22%
X
GDP
= 26.7
αC 0.60 Assumed
αI 0.40 Assumed
λl 1.20 Assumed
λi 1.10 Assumed
ξ 0.375 Domenech and Taguas (1995)
ηC 5 Adolfson et al. (2007)
ηI 2.5 Adolfson et al. (2007)
ηX 5 Assumed
χ 2 Christiano et al. (2005)
ς 15 Assumed
Government
G
GDP
0.173 Data
TR
GDP
0.05 Data
D
GDP
0.641 Data
τ c 0.18 Data
τSS 0.257 Data
τa = τ k 0.148 Capital taxes
GDP
= 5.2%
ISS 15 Data
 0.56 S.S. expeditures
GDP
= 9.5%
4 Findings: the expansion
We now analyze the quantitative performance of this model economy beyond 1998
with a two-fold purpose. First, we want to evaluate to what extent the large decline in
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 25 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1107
interest rates and the intense demographic changes observed in the Spanish economy
after 1998 may explain the evolution of the main macro-aggregates in this country
over the period 1998-2008. And second, we aim to quantify how this evolution could
have changed under different scenarios concerning fiscal policy and labor and product
markets distortions.
4.1 The role of demographic changes
In Spain, traditionally an out-migration country, immigration inflows reached a sig-
nificant scale in the years immediately before the creation of EMU and accelerated
afterwards. Thus, foreign population residing in Spain increased from 0.35 millions
(1% of total population) in 1995 to 5.22 millions (11% of total population) in 2008.
In addition, these inflows have modified the age distribution in the Spanish pop-
ulation reducing its dependency ratio since, as usual, the age distribution of the
immigrants that entered into Spain has been younger than that of natives. On top of
that, survival and fertility probabilities have also changed over time. To evaluate the
macroeconomic impact of these developments in the context of our model, we depart
from our economy calibrated to 1998 and assume that demographic variables evolve
as follows:
Immigration inflows.- We assume that, beginning in 1999, immigration flows be-
have according to the long-term demographic projections of the Instituto Nacional de
Estadística (INE).11 The age distribution of these immigration inflows is assumed to
be constant over time and equal to that of new immigrants entering in Spain in 1999
according to the Estadística de Variaciones Residenciales.12 For computational rea-
sons, we also assume that immigrants can only enter the country with ages between
16 and 44. In 1999, the immigrants who entered in Spain with these ages accounted
for 60% of the total.
Survival and fertility probabilities.- Rather than assuming that these probabilities
stay constant beyond 1998, as in the calibration exercise, we assume that they change
11Specifically, we use the projections published in May 2005. In January 2010, the INE reviewed
these projections and significantly reduced the expected net immigration flows in the long-run. Dif-
ferent simulation exercises, available from the authors upon request, show that the main qualitative
results discussed in this paper are robust to this revision of the long-term immigration dynamics.
12These data refer to 10-years age groups. We make it annual by fitting a second order polynomial
to the available age distribution.
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over time in order to match the average fertility and life-expectancy data in the UN
World Population Prospects for Spain. These projections end in 2050. Afterwards,
we assume that the survival and fertility probabilities stay constant at their 2050
levels.
Findings.- The response of our calibrated model economy to the demographic
developments described above over the period 1998-2008 is summarized in Figure
1 and Table 2. A first implication of these demographic changes is a fall in the
dependency ratio of the economy. This can be seen in panel I of Figure 1, which
compares, for the period 1998-2008, the dependency ratio in the calibration exercise
(Baseline) and the associated to the demographic changes witnessed in Spain after
1998. In the model, this expansion of working-age population leads to a rise in
aggregate employment, in aggregate investment and, consequently, in GDP. In this
sense, according to the model, the observed demographic changes in Spain would
have been responsible, on its own, for 60% of the observed expansion in aggregate
investment (Table 2).
Table 2: Role of demographic changes
Data Model
1998 2008 1998 2008
Investment/GDP 23.5% 29.3% 23.4% 26.9%
Public Debt/GDP 64.1% 39.5% 64.1% 53.8%
Foreign Assets/GDP −31.7% −80.6% −31.7% −44.9%
Fiscal consolidation in Spain during the period 1998-2008 contributed to a con-
siderable reduction in the ratio of public debt to GDP, that decreased from 64.1%
in 1998 to 39.5% in 2008. This consolidation, achieved both through a reduction in
expenditures and through an increase in revenues, made public accounts to gradually
move from a deficit of around 3% of GDP in 1998 to a surplus of around 2% of GDP
in 2007.13 In response to the demographic changes considered above, the model can
account for 42% of the improvement in the ratio of public debt to GDP observed in
the data. This has to do, mostly, with the increase in tax revenues associated to the
expansion of economic activity, although the fall in the dependency ratio also con-
tributes to a reduction in public debt via improving the balance of the social security
14In this exercise we are keeping the share of government spending in GDP constant at a 17.3%,
as in the calibration exercise.
13In 2008, however, with the arrival of the global financial crisis, government disbursements in-
creased again, revenues fell and public deficit reached 4% of GDP.
system.14
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The Spanish current account balance as a percentage of GDP fell almost monoton-
ically during the 1998-2008 period and led to a very intense deterioration in the share
of net foreign assets in GDP, that decreased from −31.7% in 1998 to −80.6% in
2008.15 According to the model, 27% of this deterioration could be explained by the
demographic changes hitting the economy. In the model, the aforementioned increase
in investment driven by demographic changes, together with minor changes in aggre-
gate savings, impacts negatively on the current account and leads to a worsening
in the economy’s external imbalance (measured as the ratio of net foreign assets to
GDP).
In Figure 1 panels III and IV compare the evolution over time of the ratios of
public debt and of net foreign assets to GDP in the model economy and in the data.
According to the model, much of the observed short-term dynamics of these ratios
would be driven by the aforementioned demographic changes. A better accounting of
these observed dynamics requires incorporating additional elements into the model
economy. We do this next.
15The increasing current account deficits over this period, despite the process of consolidation
of public accounts, clearly points to the rise in private indebtedness as the main origin of Spain’s
external imbalance.
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Figure 1. Demographic changes: data vs. model.
4.2 The role of interest rates
Despite a slight increase after 2005, the fall in ex-post real interest rates in Spain dur-
ing the 1998-2008 period was truly remarkable.16 Nominal convergence in the run-up
to EMU, lax monetary policy since the early 2000s, anchoring of inflation expecta-
tions, and a positive inflation differential in Spain are behind that large decrease. To
evaluate the macroeconomic impact of this interest rate evolution, we depart from
16It is somehow controversial, however, to what extent this fall truly resembles a reduction in the
cost of financing. For some (see, for instance, Blanco and Restoy (2007) and Gimeno and Marques
(2008)), the reduction in inflation uncertainty explains a great deal of the decline in real interest
rates, so that the actual real cost of financing might have decreased significantly less than that
indicated by ex-post real rates.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 29 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1107
our model economy calibrated to 1998 and consider, together with the demographic
developments described above, two alternative interest rate scenarios.
Scenarios.- To construct these scenarios we take the smoothed evolution of the
ex-post real short-term interest rate (measured as the one year Euribor) in Spain over
the period 1998-2008 and consider two possibilities. In the first scenario we assume
that the fall in interest rates observed over the period 1998-2008 is transitory, so that
by 2010 the interest rate gets back to its 1998’s level, staying constant afterwards. In
the second scenario, instead, we consider that the fall in interest rates is permanent.
Namely, rather than returning to their 1998’s levels, interest rates increase slightly
between 2008-2010 and stay constant at a 1.5% level afterwards. These scenarios are
depicted in Figure 2.
Findings.- Departing from our initial state in 1998, we now incorporate into our
model economy both the demographic changes described in Section 4.1 and the in-
terest rate scenarios in Figure 2. In addition to the macroeconomic effects discussed
above induced by demographic changes, the fall in interest rates (in both scenarios)
has two main effects in the economy. Very intuitively, it contributes to a further
expansion in aggregate investment and, via a reduction in the debt burden, to a more
intense improvement in public debt (Table 3). It turns out that the former effect
Figure 2. Interest rate scenarios.
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dominates so that the fall in interest rates leads to a further deterioration of the
economy’s international investment position. Naturally, all these effects are larger
when the fall in interest rates is permanent (Scenario #2) rather than transitory
(Scenario #1).
Table 3: Role of interest rates and demographic changes
Data Model
1998 2008 2008 (Scenario #1) 2008 (Scenario #2)
Investment/GDP 23.5% 29.3% 27.4% 30.1%
Public Debt/GDP 64.1% 39.5% 41.3% 40.1%
Foreign Assets/GDP −31.7% −80.6% −63.9% −77.3%
Not surprisingly, by adding the observed interest rate developments, the model
delivers a better description of the evolution of the ratios of public debt and of net
foreign assets to GDP in the Spanish economy over the period 1998-2008 (Figure
3). Thus, according to the model, the developments in interest rates and demo-
graphic variables observed in the Spanish economy over this period would have been
responsible for much of the observed improvement in public accounts in Spain (93%
in Scenario #1 and 97% in Scenario #2) and of the deterioration of its external
imbalance (66% in Scenario #1 and 93% in Scenario #2).
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Figure 3. Demographic and interest rate changes: data vs. model.
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4.3 The role of fiscal policy
The previous section showed that much of the investment boom, the consolidation
of public accounts and the increase in external indebtedness observed in the Spanish
economy over the period 1998-2008 can be rationalized, in the context of our model
economy, as the natural reaction of the economy to the observed developments in
interest rates and demographic variables. This section analyzes to what extent this
macroeconomic behavior would have changed if a different fiscal policy would have
been in place. In particular, we study whether a more restrictive fiscal policy, in-
volving a reduction in government consumption, could have attenuated the dramatic
deterioration of the Spanish external position over the 1998-2008 period.
Thus, rather than assuming, as in the simulation exercises described above, that
government consumption represents a constant fraction of GDP (17.3%) in each pe-
riod, we now consider two alternative fiscal policy scenarios. In these scenarios gov-
ernment consumption stays constant, in per capita terms, at its 1998’s level for 10
(Scenario #1) and 20 (Scenario #2) years. Beyond 2008 in Scenario #1, 2018 in
Scenario #2, government consumption represents again a 17.3% of GDP in each pe-
riod. Given that, as mentioned above, GDP increases in the model over the period
of analysis in response to interest rate and demographic developments, these fiscal
policy scenarios imply, in practice, a temporary reduction in the share of government
expenditure to GDP, being this more permanent in Scenario #2. Namely, in Scenario
#1 (Scenario #2) this share decreases smoothly from 17.3% in 1998 to 15.8% (14.8%)
in 2008 (2018).
Table 4 shows the results of these counterfactual exercises using as a benchmark
the exercise described in Section 4.2 that incorporates demographic changes and a
transitory fall in interest rates (Scenario #1). Intuitively, the model predicts that in
both fiscal scenarios less government consumption over the period 1999-2008 would
have led to a more intense improvement in public accounts by 2008 than that in
the benchmark case. This fiscal tightening, however, would have helped very little
in attenuating the build-up of the economy’s external imbalance over this period.
In particular, the transitory tightening of government consumption in Scenario #1
would have only reduced the size of this imbalance by 2008 by 1 percentage point. The
more permanent tightening of fiscal policy in Scenario #2 would have even increased
that imbalance.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 33 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1107
Table 4: Role of fiscal policy
Model (year 2008)
Benchmark Fiscal Scenario #1 Fiscal Scenario #2
Investment/GDP 27.4% 27.5% 28.0%
Public Debt/GDP 41.3% 36.7% 36.9%
Foreign Assets/GDP −63.9% −63.0% −75.9%
The intuition behind this little effectiveness of fiscal policy in addressing the econ-
omy’s external imbalance lies on the forward-looking behavior of households in the
model. Certainly, a reduction in government consumption leads to an improvement
in public accounts and this, by itself, attenuates the economy’s need for external fi-
nancing. However, to the extent that households anticipate that the reduction in the
share of public debt to GDP is going to imply a reduction in labor income taxes in
the future (once the fiscal rule (28) operates), they immediately modify their labor
and consumption profiles so that current private borrowing increases. This increase
therefore counteracts the fall in public financing needs and, depending on the tempo-
ral dimension of the fiscal tightening, it may even imply a more intense deterioration
in the economy’s external imbalance.
4.4 The role of labor and product market distortions
The Spanish economy is characterized by the existence of important distortions in the
labor and product markets, which hinder productivity growth, a proper allocation of
resources and, more broadly, damage the external competitiveness of the economy. In
this section we explore how structural reforms on these markets could have affected
the macroeconomic performance of the Spanish economy over the period 1998-2008.
In particular, we study the reaction of our model economy to a 2 percentage points
decrease in the labor and product markets markups. Christopoulou and Vermeulen
(2008) report that the markup in the U.S. manufacturing sector was, on average
over the period 1993-2004, 6 p.p. greater than in the Euro Area. In a similar vein,
Andres, Ortega and Valles (2008) argue that a 5 p.p. differential in the product
market markup is a conservative estimate of the importance of markup differences
across European markets. In this sense, our simulated reduction in markups would
entail closing around one third of these differences in the competitive environment.
A number of papers in the literature have conducted quantitative exercises similar
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to ours. For instance, Gomes et al. (2009) show the macroeconomic implications of
a decline in German markups in the product and labor markets of 5, 10 and 15 p.p.
Moreover, Kilponen and Ripatti (2006) show the effects for the Finnish economy of a
reduction of 5 p.p. in the labor market markup and of 2 p.p. in the product market
markup.
As in the previous section, we use the exercise described in Section 4.2 that in-
corporates demographic changes and a transitory fall in interest rates (Scenario #1)
as a benchmark. Departing from that benchmark, we first consider a labor market
reform setting λl = 1.18 (rather than 1.20) and then a product market reform setting
λi = 1.08 (rather than 1.10). Not surprisingly, reducing the inefficiencies in these
markets leads, compared to the benchmark, to an expansion of economic activity,
with increases in aggregate investment and employment, and to an improvement in
external competitiveness. According to the model, the positive effects of the same 2
p.p. reduction in the markup are larger if the reform is carried out in the product
market rather than in the labor market. Namely, with a product market reform,
GDP, employment and the terms of trade would have been, by 2008, 1.5% higher,
0.7% higher and 0.3% lower, respectively, than with a labor market reform. On the
long run, these differences persist: GDP, employment and the terms of trade would
have been 1.6% higher, 0.6% higher and 0.3% lower, respectively, with a 2 p.p. de-
crease in the product market markup than with the same decrease in the labor market
markup.
The impact that these structural reforms would have had on Spanish publics
accounts and on the economy’s external imbalance over the period 1998-2008 is sum-
marized in Table 5. Due to the aforementioned expansion of economic activity, the
consolidation of public accounts over this period would have been more intense with
the reforms. The external imbalance of the economy, however, would have been
higher by 2008 if the reforms had been carried out. The reason for this result is that,
as in the case of fiscal policy, households anticipate lower taxes and a more efficient
economy in the future. Thus, in order to smooth consumption, they increase current
private borrowing what, together with the increase in aggregate investment, domi-
nate the improvement in public accounts and then lead to a more intense external
indebtedness.
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Table 5: Role of labor and product market distortions
Model (year 2008)
Benchmark Labor Market Reform Product Market Reform
Investment/GDP 27.4% 27.6% 28.4%
Public Debt/GDP 41.3% 38.0% 36.6%
Foreign Assets/GDP −63.9% −65.0% −68.4%
Fiscal policy vs. structural reforms.- According to the model, an structural reform
in the product market (like the one considered in this section) could achieve a short-
run reduction (over the 1998-2008 period) in the ratio of public debt to GDP similar
to that achieved with the fiscal tightening exercises presented in Section 4.3. This,
together with fact that the long-term positive effects of structural reforms on GDP,
employment, investment and competitiveness are absent with alternative fiscal policy
experiments, strongly point to structural reforms as a powerful instrument to pursue
improvements in the economy’s public accounts, not only for the period 1998-2008
but for the future. In this sense, as mentioned above, the fact that these reforms may
lead to a deterioration in the economy’s external imbalance in the short run should
not be worrisome. It naturally comes from i) increased investment (once inefficiencies
have been reduced) and ii) households’ smoothing behavior (as the economy will be
wealthier in the future with less distortions).
5 Findings: beyond the financial crisis
The previous section showed the performance of the model over the period 1998-2008
under alternative scenarios. This section, instead, studies its implications beyond
2008. To do that in a meaningful way, we first introduce several shocks into the
model economy in 2008 that aim to capture the arrival of the global financial crisis
to the Spanish economy. Once these shocks have been incorporated, we address two
questions: i) how the macroeconomic evolution predicted for the Spanish economy
beyond 2008 has changed due to the global financial crisis and ii) to what extent that
predicted evolution may be altered by fiscal policy and structural reforms.
5.1 The global financial crisis
In order to incorporate into our model economy the arrival of the global financial
crisis in 2008 we take, as a benchmark, the exercise described in Section 4.2 including
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demographic changes and a transitory fall in interest rates (Scenario #1), and assume
that the economy is hit by the following shocks in 2008:
(S1) Between 2008 and 2009 capital depreciates an additional 10% and the de-
preciation rate goes back smoothly to its initial calibrated level (δ = 0.0995) in 5
years.
(S2) Beyond 2008, during 20 years, TFP growth is 1 percentage point smaller
than in the benchmark.
(S3) In 2009, the age-specific index, ei, which transforms households’ raw labor
hours into efficient units of labor, decreases by 10% and it goes back to its initial level
after 5 years.
(S4) In 2009, the share of government consumption plus government transfers in
GDP increases by 5 p.p. with respect to the benchmark and it goes back smoothly
to its calibrated level (G+TR
GDP
= 0.223) in 10 years.17
Certainly, the global financial crisis has hit the Spanish economy in many different
dimensions, some of which can not be incorporated into the framework developed in
this paper. Consequently, the aim of this exercise is not to perform a full account
of the quantitative implications of the crisis, but to broadly incorporate its main
consequences. In this sense, shock (S1) tries to capture the view that much of the
investment made in Spain during the last expansionary phase was not as productive
as initially thought so that its value will need to adjust gradually. The second shock
(S2) we consider is a fall in TFP growth. This could be justified on two grounds:
as a revision of households’ expectations about future growth prospects (maybe too
optimistic before the crisis) and/or as a way of capturing the real effects of the fi-
nancial turmoil. The recent crisis has also led to a very rapid and intense increase
in unemployment, that rose from around 9% in 2007 to around 19% in 2009, whose
future reduction is expected to be very gradual. Shock (S3) incorporates into our
model economy the effects of this fall in the workforce. Finally, with the arrival of
the crisis public accounts in Spain have experienced a quick and intense deterioration.
This has been mostly due to the work of automatic stabilizers and to the expansion-
ary programs put in place by the government to mitigate the effects of the crisis. In
our model, this is captured by shock (S4). It should be noted that, although the
magnitude of these shocks has not been chosen to replicate the observed deteriora-
17In each year, the increase in G+TRGDP with respect to the benchmark is split evenly between
government consumption and transfers.
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tion of macroeconomic aggregates over the crisis period, they are able to generate a
contraction of real GDP between 2008 and 2009 of -1.7%, which is in line with the
HP-filtered growth rate observed in the data (-1.66%). Furthermore, in terms of the
dynamics of public accounts, the model generates an increase in public deficit of 6
p.p. (7 p.p. in the data).
5.2 The effects of the crisis
Departing from our benchmark in 2008, Figure 4 shows the short-run behavior of
our model economy beyond that date with and without the arrival in 2008 of the
global financial crisis, represented by the shocks described in Section 4.1. Two main
conclusions can be extracted from this figure. First, even without the arrival of the
crisis, in the short-run the Spanish economy would have entered into a phase of lower,
even negative, GDP growth where the external imbalance of the economy would have
been reduced but where public accounts would have deteriorated. In this non-crisis
scenario, that already incorporates an increase in interest rates beyond 2008, these
dynamics are driven to a large extent by demographic changes. Namely, by the
behavior of the dependency ratio in Spain that, after decreasing over the period
1998-2008 due to immigration inflows (panel I, Figure 1), increases again in 2009
and especially over the period 2020-2050 with the aging of the Spanish baby boom
generation (Figure 5). In the short-run, this reduction of the working-age population
has an obvious negative effect on GDP and investment (which helps to correct the
external imbalance of the economy) and, due to social security expenditures, on public
accounts.
And second, in the short-run, the arrival of the global financial crisis accentuates
the aforementioned dynamics that would have taken place without the crisis. Namely,
the deterioration of GDP growth and public accounts and the improvement of the
economy’s external imbalance. To the extent that the crisis constitutes a negative
wealth shock for the economy, households’ consumption reduces substantially with
respect to the non-crisis scenario, what explains the more intense improvement in
the economy’s the external imbalance. In addition, the shock increasing government
consumption and transfers clearly leads to a deeper deterioration in public accounts.
Finally, the negative shocks to the capital stock and to the age-specific index, ei, cause
an immediate fall in GDP after the crisis, which only recovers gradually. In this sense,
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 38 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1107
the model predicts that by 2018 the economy is able to get back to the GDP level
that would have had without the arrival of the crisis. At that moment, however,
GDP starts deviating again from the non-crisis scenario. The reason is that in 2018
the fiscal rule (28) begins to operate in the crisis scenario and, given the increase in
the debt to GDP ratio over the period 2009-2018, it leads to a substantial increase in
labor taxes. Intuitively, this tax increase improves the dynamics of public accounts
beyond 2018 (panels II and III, Figure 4) but cause a fall in aggregate labor what
has an adverse effect on GDP. Note, however, that, as shown in Figure 6, the global
financial crisis does not have any long-term effect on the economy and, in particular,
on GDP. This is a natural consequence of the way in which we have modelled the
crisis in Section 5.1, exclusively through temporary shocks.
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Figure 4. Short-run behavior with and without financial crisis.
Note: GDP (panel I), deficit to GDP (panel III) and current account to GDP (panel V)
normalized by the corresponding 2008’s levels in the model economy.
I. GDP.
II. Public debt. III. Public defficit.
IV. International investment position. V. Current account.
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Figure 5. Dependency ratio.
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Figure 6. Long-run behavior with and without financial crisis.
Note: GDP (panel I) normalized by its 2008’s level in the model economy.
I. GDP.
II. Public debt.
III. International investment position.
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5.3 The role of structural reforms and fiscal policy
Product market reform.- Figure 7 shows the short-run behavior of our model econ-
omy beyond 2008 when, besides the shocks coming from the global financial crisis,
in 2009 the economy experiences a permanent fall in the markup in the intermediate
goods market of 2 p.p. (λi falls from 1.10 to 1.08). Very intuitively, with respect
to a non-reform scenario (With crisis), in the short-run this structural reform miti-
gates the deterioration in output and in public accounts caused by the crisis without
significantly affecting the economy’s external imbalance. The effect of the reform on
GDP is particularly strong. With the reform, the economy could recover the GDP
level that it would have had without the arrival of the crisis before, compared to a
non-reform scenario (2014 vs. 2018), and it could even enjoy of greater output levels
compared to a non-crisis scenario for some time (over the period 2014-2025). In addi-
tion to these short-term effects, this structural reform also has important long-term
effects in line with those discussed in Section 4.4. In particular, output is higher and
public debt is lower in the long-run when the distortions in the product market are
reduced.
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I. GDP.
II. Public debt. III. Public deficit.
IV. International investment position. V. Current account.
Figure 7. Short-run behavior with product market reform.
Note: GDP (panel I), deficit to GDP (panel III) and current account to GDP (panel V)
normalized by the corresponding 2008’s levels in the model economy.
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I. GDP. II. Public debt.
Figure 8. Long-run behavior with product market reform.
Note: GDP (panel I) normalized by its 2008’s level in the model economy.
Fiscal policy.- In the crisis scenario (With crisis) considered so far the arrival of
the global financial crisis was accompanied by a shock to the share of government
consumption plus government transfers in GDP. Namely, we assumed that in 2009
this share increases by 5 p.p. with respect to the non-crisis scenario and that it goes
back smoothly to its calibrated level (G+TR
GDP
= 0.223) in 10 years. To evaluate how
fiscal policy can modify the macroeconomic evolution of the Spanish economy beyond
2008, we now consider two alternative fiscal scenarios. The aim of Scenario #1 is to
assess the effectiveness of fiscal policy in mitigating the output losses induced by
the crisis in the short-run. To that extent, it considers a smaller fiscal shock than
in the crisis scenario in 2009 (G+TR
GDP
only increases by 2.5 p.p. with respect to the
benchmark) that takes 10 years to correct. Scenario #2, instead, tries to evaluate
the gains of front-loading in fiscal consolidation. For that purpose, it considers a
fiscal shock with the same initial size as the one considered in the crisis scenario, but
that reverts to the benchmark in 5 years rather than 10. Figure 9 shows how these
alternative fiscal policies modify the short-run behavior of our model economy once
it has been hit by the global financial crisis.
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I. GDP.
II. Public debt. III. Public deficit.
IV. International investment position. V. Current account.
Figure 9 Short-run behavior with tighter fiscal policy.
Note: GDP (panel I), deficit to GDP (panel III) and current account to GDP (panel V)
normalized by the corresponding 2008’s levels in the model economy.
.
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As it is clear from the figure, a tighter fiscal policy leads to a less intense dete-
rioration in public accounts and, for the reasons detailed in Section 4.3, it has very
little effects on the economy’s external imbalance. In terms of output, the response
of the model economy to the two fiscal scenarios considered is very similar. While an
expansionary fiscal policy does not appear to be very effective in mitigating output
losses in the short-run, a more intense front-loading in fiscal consolidation substan-
tially helps in avoiding the medium-term (beyond 2018) output losses associated to
the crisis scenario. In particular, with a faster the consolidation, the eventual increase
in taxes needed to restore fiscal soundness is smaller, what has a less adverse effect
on aggregate labor and output.
6 Concluding remarks
The emergence of a huge current account deficit was one of the main characteristics
marking developments in the Spanish economy during the period of robust economic
growth prior to the current crisis. This paper tries to disentangle the main drivers
behind this upswing. To this end, we calibrate a small open-economy model for Spain
that replicates relatively well the main features of the Spanish economy during the
last decade. According to this model two main factors arise as particularly relevant
in explaining these developments. First, the decline in interest rates derived from
Spain’s participation in the European Monetary Union; and further, the far-reaching
demographic change brought about by huge immigration flows.
Apart from the role of these two factors, which have already been emphasized by
the existing literature, our paper investigates the role played by economic policies
in the build-up of the Spanish external imbalance. First, considerable attention has
been given in the related literature to the potential role fiscal policy might play in
the reduction of this imbalance. In this paper, the role of fiscal policy is analyzed
by means of two counterfactual scenarios that try to measure what the external
imbalance would have been if significantly tighter fiscal policies had been applied
during the last decade. This restrictive fiscal policy is simulated through lower public
expenditure growth than that observed in the data. Our results show that the role
that a tightening of fiscal policy could have played in the reduction of the Spanish
external imbalance would have been very limited and would have depended on the
temporal dimension of this tightening. A transitory change in fiscal policy would
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have reduced the economy’s external imbalance only very slightly, by affecting public
savings without significantly distorting private ones. Instead, a permanent fiscal
tightening would have had a negative effect on the economy’s net foreign assets as it
would have distorted optimal decisions by forward looking agents and reduced private
savings.
Second, we investigate the role played by labor and product market reforms in
the correction of this imbalance. This is relevant insofar as the Spanish economy
experienced a progressive increase in its prices and costs relative to those of its main
competitors during the economic boom, which may have had an effect on net exports,
and there is evidence that this rise in relative prices and wages is related to labor
market rigidities and insufficient competition in some markets. Our results show that,
if structural reforms in labor and product markets had been adopted in the Spanish
economy over the period 1998-2008, the expansion of economic activity, investment
and employment would have been more intense than the one observed over that pe-
riod. The external competitiveness of the economy would have also improved relative
to a non-reform scenario and the improvement in public accounts would have been
larger. These reforms, however, would have implied a further deterioration of the
Spanish external imbalance over the 1998-2008 period. Increased investment, once
market distortions had been reduced, and reduced private savings, as households try
to smooth their consumption anticipating lower taxes and a more efficient economy
in the future, would be responsible for this further deterioration.
The framework set out in this paper has also been used to analyze the different
policy options faced by the Spanish economy after the crisis. Several results are
worth mentioning. First, even without the arrival of the crisis, in the medium- and
long-run the Spanish economy would have entered into a phase of lower GDP growth
where the external imbalance of the economy would have been reduced but where
public accounts would have deteriorated. This process, mostly driven by the aging of
the Spanish population, a factor that is common to most industrialized countries, has
become more pronounced with global financial crisis. Second, the model highlights the
relevance of fiscal policy and of structural reforms in the post-crisis scenario. Front-
loading in fiscal consolidation would contribute to public accounts’ sustainability and
to mitigate the output losses induced by the crisis in the medium-term. In addition,
policies aimed at improving competition help in reducing short- and medium-term
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output losses, while inducing a positive long-run effect on the level of output. In light
of the complementarities between these policies, the recovery of economic activity in
Spain after the crisis could be more successful and less costly if they were implemented
together.
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Appendix
Definition of equilibrium
The equilibrium of the model is a list of sequences of:
• prices {rt, pH,t, pH,j,t, pF,t, pF,z,t, pK,t, pI,t, Wt, w˜i,t, wi,t},
• taxes τ ct , τ lt, τ sst , τat , τ kt

,
• transfers {bt, ssi,n,t, trt, SSt, TRt},
• and quantities {Ni,n,t, ci,n,t, Ct, CH,t, CF,t, ai,n,t, At, hi,n,t, Yt, YH,t, yH,j,t, YF,t,
Lt, Li,t, LH,j,t, Kt, KH,j,t, It, IH,t, IF,t, Gt, GH,t, GF,t, Dt, Xt, Y ∗t },
such that, at each point in time t:
• the age structure of the population follows the law of motions (1)-(3),
• agents maximize lifetime utility (4) subject to the period by period budget
constraints (5),
• all firms maximize profits,
• accidental bequests are given by:
bt =

n
I
i=IA
μi−1,n,t−1ai,n,t(1− si−1,t−1)
(1 + npt−1)

n
I
i=IA
μi,n,t
(31)
where npt−1 is the population growth rate between periods t− 1 and t,
• dividends received by households are equal to:
divt =
1
0
πH,j,t dj +
IR−1
i=IA
πL,i,t + dt

n
I
i=IA
Ni,n,t
(32)
• the budget constraint of the government (27) is satisfied,
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• labor markets clear:
Li,t =

n
μi,n,thi,n,t (33)
Lt =
⎡
⎣
IR−1
i=IA

1
IR − IA
λlt−1
λlt
(eiLi,t)
1
λlt
⎤
⎦
λlt
(34)
1
0
LH,j,t dj = Lt (35)
• the market for physical capital clears:
Kt =
1
0
KH,j,t dj (36)
• the market for the composite of domestic intermediate goods clears:
YH,t = CH,t + IH,t (1 + S(·)) +GH,t +Xt (37)
• and the aggregate budget constraint of the economy holds:
Ct + pI,tIt (1 + S(·)) +Gt +DACt + FAt+1 − (1 + rt)FAt = pH,tYH,t (38)
where FAt+1 = At+1 −Dt+1 denotes the net foreign asset position of the country
at the end of period t and DACt is the dividends adjustment cost.
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